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BORDER LINES OF JUDICIAL POWER
All we have of freedom-all we use or know-
This our fathers bought for us, long and long ago.
Ancient Right unnoticed as the breath we draw-
Leave to live by no man's leave underneath the Law.
-Rudyard Kipling.
Monesquieu's oft-cited theory that a separation of government into three dis-
tinct departments of magistracies of the executive, legislative and judicial, laid the
foundation of English liberty, is said by some writers to be the inspiration of the
tripartite scheme of government which characterizes our federal constitution as
well as most state constitutions.
Observance of this familiar doctrine has frequently served as an effective
check against the adoption of foolish fads and the mischievous projects of aggres-
sive fanatical blocs or persistent self-serving "pressure groups;" but there is nothing
in the constitution of the United States which requires such a system in the individual
states. Some of the latter contain no such provision in their fundamental law.'
Great Britain and the other autonomous members of the British Commonwealth
of Nations, now prefer a system of responsible government which unites thL
legislative and executive branches; and there still survives at Westminster, a union
of legislative and judicial power in the persons of the law lords, of the House of
Lords; and for over a century there has been a joinder of judicial and executive
power in the membership of the judicial committee of the Privy Council. In our
own land, plurality of office-holding seems to have been taken as a matter of
course, during the lifetime of the Founders of the Republic, regardless of classifi-
cation. Even the punctilious John Marshall, who had worked hard for the ratifi-
cation of our Federal Constitution, once held the incompatible offices of Secretary
of State and Chief Justice of the United States, simultaneously2 This idea of in-
compatibility of offices is very modern, for in England, whence so many jurisdic-
tions derive their legal systems, there was once a time when "all the functions of
the state were exercised by a single institution-the curia regis." From this group
1PRENTIS V. ATLANTIC COAST LINE Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908).
22 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL, 558 (1919). In all fairness it should be noted that
General Marshall drew but one salary during the period that he held the two offices.
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there have derived many institutions, among them the "High Court of Parliament"
and the courts of common law and equity. As pointed out by Sir William Holds-
worth,3 the common law courts supervised and controlled the activities of sub-
ordinate courts and local officials by use of the prerogative writs of certiorari, man-
damus, prohibition and quo warranto, amongst other means.4 At present, "many
cases assert that courts cannot control by injunction or any other writ the exercise
of a purely legislative or executive power.'"' The soundness of the public policy
underlying this principle of judicial limitation is unquestionable, for obviously
the activities of any one of the three magistracivs in the lawful exercise of its own
granted or inherent powers should not be subjected to domination by either of the
other branches of government. It may be remarked at this juncture, that legal
history and social experience have played a far more important part in pricking
out the boundaries between justiciable and non-justiciable fields of influence, than
that which has been the outcome of excogitation. Indeed, struggles on questions
of governmental powers, which are now looked upon as firmly settled, have not
always been restricted to debate. Oliver Cromwell, as is well known, imprisoned
SirHarry Vane, for writing a book in which the position was taken that the army
should be subordinate to parliament. In at least one instance,6 American judges
have been impeached for refusing to enforce an unconstitutional enactment.
Of necessity every branch of the government of a free people is a judge in the
first instance of its own powers, otherwise it could not function; and in order to
perform its duties with efficiency and despatch, it is frequently empowered to
employ methods of procedure which captious people might say appertain to other
branches of governmnt. Thus, for illustration, the executive frequently enacts
orders, rules and regulations for the transaction of the business which it is its duty
to attend to, and, of necessity, is constantly required to make adjudications upon
claims and other questions in the course of exercising its inherent or delegated
powers. Some of these necessary, desirable, incidental, ancillary or inherent powers
generally aft embodied in written constitutions. A striking example of this is
found in the legislative power of approving or disapproving statutes, which affords
the President or a governor a suspensive power of perusing proposed legislation
which it might thereafter become his duty to enforce. In recognition of this par-
ticipative power in legislation, many writers have classed the chief executive as the
"third legislative house." A number of commentators go further and term courts
of law a fourth legislative chamber because of their power and duty of interpreting
legislation, as well as what some of these writers consider a power of annulment of
statutory law.
SSOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAw, 41 (1938).
4Among these "subordinate courts" were the old ecclesiastical courts of England, to which we
owe so much of the probate law and the marriage law of today. McKean, CANON LAw IN AmEUr-
CAN JuRISDICTIONS, 39 Dickinson Law Review, 75 (1935).
6SmrrH v. MYERS, 109 Ind. 1, 6 (1886).
MTaaVETT v. WEEDON, R. I. 1786, Thayer, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 73.
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It is believed that there is little foundation for such an eccentric designation
of judicial tribunals. On the contrary, if there be any American institution capable
of being recognized as a fourth legislative chamber, it is the authority whereby a
written constitution is ordained or amended. It is this power which revealed
itself in the recall of a court decision in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia by the
adoption of the 11th Amendment;' and it is the same power which was strikingly
evidenced by the passage of the 21st Amendment which repealed the 18th Amend-
ment. In short, it is the same supreme power which formulates the paramount law
of the land, to which all American governments are subject. Aside from these
considerations, the very narrow limits within which courts in common law and
civil law jurisdictions are empowered and expected to solve jural problems for
which applicable precedents or statutes are lacking, hardly justify the numerous
writings of those who unqualifiedly assert that courts legislate.s Probably the
fairest comment on this particular point, is that of the late Mr. Justice Holmes, who,
with a characteristic neatness of phrase, stated in one of his opinions that courts
legislate "interstitially." In other words, the so-called legislation by courts of law,
in modern times, is relatively trivial, as may be perceived by any one who realizes
that there are numerous limitations which restrict judicial activity. For instance,
it is observable that nowhere in jurisdictions where English or derivative systems
of law obtain, do we find courts of law possessing the legislative power of abrogat-
ing thoroughly established doctrines or principles of the common law.9 They have
no right to pass upon the wisdom or expediency of legislation, and should not pre-
sume to censor enactments because of the motives of the legislators who had voted
for their passage. 10 It is likewise well established that no tribunal possesses
authority to inquire into the righteousness of constitutional statutes."l In other
words, if a court should take it upon itself to inquire into the necessity for enacting
a statute, it would thereby "pass the line which circumscribes the judicial depart-
ment and .. . . tread on legislative ground."12 A very apposite suggestion in
72 Dali. 419 (U. S. 1793); 3 Dal. (U. S. 1798).
SMcKean, "The Law of Laws," 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. Rev. 950 (1930).
9REX v. WHEATLEY, 2 Burr. 1125 (Eng. 1761) ; REX v. WILKES, 4 Burr. 2527 (Eng. 1770);
REx v. PEDLEY, 1 Leach 242, (Eng. 1782); MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA V. INTERNATIONAL
TRUST Co., 25 Colo. App. 26, 49, (1913); HULETT v. CAREY, 66 Minn. 327, 341 (1896); ALLEN,
LAW IN THE MAKING, 173 (1927) ; McKean, The Rule of Precedents, 76 U. of Pa. Law Rev., 481,
489 (1928).
10MAYNARD V. HILL, 125 U. S. 190, 209 (1888); GERMAN ALLIANCE INSURANCE Co. v.
LEWIS, 233 U. S. 389, 414 (1914); SMITH V. KANSAS CITY TITLE & TRUST Co., 255 U. S. 180, 210
(1921); GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO. v. DANVILLE, 367 Ill. 310 (1937); ANDREWS V.
HENEY, 178 Ind. 1, 98 N. E. 628 (1912); WELCH V. SWASEY, 193 Mass. 364, 376 (1907); CAS-
sIaY v. KRAFT-PHENIX CHEESE CORPORATION, 280 N. W. 814, (Mich. 1938); STATE V. ROBERTS,
74 N. H. 476 (1908); STATE V. WRIGHTSON, 56 N. J. L. 126, 191 (1893); LIVINGSTON V. VAN
INGEN, 9 Johns. 507, 564 (N. Y. 1812); STATE v. ANSON, 132 Wis. 451, 473 (1907).
I1PEOPLE V. JOHNSON, 288 Ill. 442 (1919); COMMONWEALTH V. MIXER, 207 Mass. 141
(1910); PEOPLE v. HATINGER, 174 Mich. 333 (1913); STATE V. CORBETr, 57 Minn. 345 (1894);
COMMONWEALTH V. MoIR, 199 Pa. 534 (1901); STATE v. HARRINGTON, 68 Vt. (1896).
12MCCULLOUGH V. MARYLAND, 4 Wheat. 316, 423 (U. S. 1819). BOSKE V. COMINGORE, 177
U. S. 459, 468 (1900); CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RY. Co. v. STATE, 47 Neb. 549, 573,
(1896); COMMONWEALTH v. STOFCHEK, 322 Pa. 513 (1936); ACCORD.
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relation to this point, is Chief Justice Waite's maxim, "For protection against
abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."
The utmost that it is permissible for the judicial interpreter to do in dealing
with valid legislation which appears to be unjust or unwise, is to resort to the
rebuttable presumptions against inconvenience or unreasonableness, as canons of
interpretation; but an attempt to strain these presumptions against the plain man-
dates of a statute would be ultra vires in all common law jurisdictions. Never-
theless, the United States Supreme Court has felt it necessary to remind us that
whether legislation is needed, whether it is harmful, is solely a matter of policy.13
And it must not be overlooked that policy is a political question, and consequently
is not, in itself, a subject of judicial review. 14 We have seen that it is not the habit
of courts to question the policy of valid enactments. It is equally manifest that it
would be inadvisable for legislative bodies to divest themselves of official re-
spoisibility by delegating the performance of duties within their exclusive province.
Such an attempted abdication of its governmental functions by an elective representa-
tive body, whether to executive, judicial or administrative officers of the govern-
ment would be futile in the long run, by reason of the due process principle of
American constitutions. In the words of Chief Justice Gibson, of Pennsylvania,
"Under a well-balanced constitution the legislature can no more delegate its proper
function than can the judiciary."'1
Many limitations upon the activities of the different branches of government,
including those already specified in this article, are the resultant of numerous con-
siderations, such as comity, sense of duty, fitness and propriety, reasonableness,
necessity and practicability. Above all it is highly desirable in the best interests
of decency and order, that each branch of the government shall recognize and fulfil
its duty to presume that another has acted legally, and not to assume otherwise,
except in very clear cases. Accordingly, with a view to avoid anarchical friction,
as well as with a desire to refrain from usurpative encroachment upon the domain
of a co-ordinate branch of the government, courts will not pass upon the consti-
tutional validity of legislation except where essential to the determination of a
case.16 Occasionally this oft-stated rule has been overlooked or ignored. In con-
sequence of such neglect cases are sometimes found in the law reports in which an
appellate court has made a ruling that it has no power to proceed in the premises,
and then, by way of dictum (sometimes cited as authoritative decision, by com-
mentators and others), set forth a view that an action or statute attempted to be
18NEW YORK v. MCCALL, 245 U. S. 345 (1917); UNITED STATES v. DARBY, 312 U. S. 657
(1941) SEMBLE.
14LICENSE TAx CASE, 5 Wall. 462 (U. S. 1866).
16CF. CURRIN V. WALLACE, 306 U. S. 1 (1939).
16ARKA.NSAS-LoUISIANA GAS Co. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, 304 U. S. 61, 64
(1938); FIRST TRUST CO. OF LINCOLN V. SMITH, 277 N. W. 762 (1938 Neb.); LIINS' PETITION
(No. 1) 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 625 (1908); RE DICKINSON, 2 B. C. 262 (1892); 1 Cooley, CONSTITU-
TIONAL IMITATIONS, 338 (8th ed. 1927).
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attacked is unconstitutional. A striking instance of this is illustrated by the case of
Perry v. United States,17 where the court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove
damage to its satisfaction (and was thereby disqualified from maintaining suit); but
did not hesitate to state its belief that a joint resolution of Congress, attacked in
said case, was unconstitutional in parts affecting certain government obligations so
far as such resolution assumed to repudiate certain promises contained in said pledges
of the government's faith. A few years later the same tribunal ruled that courts,
will not decide questions until the necessity for such decisions arises in the record
before them. x8
Unquestionably many unconstitutional laws and practices flourish without let
or hindrance for appreciable periods of time, where it so happens that circum-
stances do not arise which might render justiciable the determination of their in-
validity. A statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet prove
to be valid as applied to another condition of affairs. 19 Or, as was pointed out by
Mr. Justice Holmes, in one of his opinions, "Laws frequently are enforced which
the court recognizes as possibly or probably invalid if attacked by a different interest
or in a different way."20  Even the unconstitutionality of a statute is not within
the purview of court decision, except where the question is properly raised:2l It
follows that a punctilious court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it, and will not formulate a rule of con-
stitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.22  To summarize briefly: A court has no authority to pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation unless the question is properly raised in a bona fide
proceeding at law or in equity, and even then, only where a substantial right of a
party thereto is actually threatened or affected. Besides these considerations the
presumption of constitutionality is an important factor when dealing with con-
troversies of that character, for "a court by force of its own reasoning or by reason
of the diversity of sentiment among its own members may often conclude that,
while according to what it deems the correct view, an act is void, still there is
another view that is permissible that would support the act. As legislators the
judges would be bound to follow their own judgment, but as a court they must
accord that same right to those in whom the constitution has reposed it.28 Legis-
lative judgment is one of expediency and policy, a resultant which may prove to be
a composite of personal sentiment, political or religious belief, economic theory,
social affiliations, together with many other considerations of like nature. All
such matters may appeal to legislative judgment and play their part in influencing
17294 U. S. 330 (1935).
ISARKANSAS FUEL OIL Co. v. LOUISIANA, 304 U. S. 197, 202 (1938).
19DAHNKE-WALKER CO. v. BONDURANT, 257 U. S. 282, 289 (1921).
2
0QUONG WING v. KIRKENDALL, 223 U. S. 59, 64 (1912).
2
1SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. KING, 216 U. S. 524 (1910).
2 2
FIRST TRUST Co. OF LINCOLN V. SMITH, 277 N. W. 762 (Neb. 1938).
28ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. McGUINNESS, 78 N. J. L. 346, 373 (1910).
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the exercise of legislative discretion; but, in themselves, they are not elements
which enter into the exercise of judicial discretion. The judiciary apply existent
law to a fixed state of facts. They declare what the law is and not what they
would like it to be.
24
Many writers rashly assume that in American jurisdictions the bulk of legisla-
tion is subjected to a species of judicial censorship which they term "annulment."
According to an advertisement of a few years ago, a journalist had written a book
referring to the United States Supreme Court as "The Nine Men above the Con-
stitution." This would have been a shocking averment had it proved to be well-
founded. Not to mince the matter, it must be acknowledged that these censorious
commentators are not entirely to blame for this assumption, when we recall that
the term "annul," and its derivatives, have sometimes been employed by courts of
law and equity when jurisdictional facts force a conclusion that certain legislation
is violative of the requirements of constitutional law. As far back as the year
1795, we find a federal judge saying, "if a legislative act oppugns a constitutional
principle .... it will be the duty of the court to declare it null and void." 25 This
ascription of a power of annulment is in reality such an oversimplification of
phraseology as amounts to exaggeration. A judge has no power to act in a case
until a party to an action or some one interested therein, invokes his judgment in
some legal manner. 26 Again, "much which is harmful and unconstitutional may
take effect without any capacity in the courts to prevent it, since their whole power
is a judicial one."27 Moreover "annulment" of a statute would be the exercise of
a legislative power, and dearly ultra vires if attempted by a court of law or equity.
In other words since "neither of the three great departments of government...
can encroach upon the domain of another, (it follows that) the function of the
judicial department, with respect to legislation deemed unconstitutional, is not
exercised in rem but always in personam. The Supreme Court cannot set aside a
statute as it can a municipal ordinance. It simply ignores statutes declared un-
constitutional. " 28 For the most part, a court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the
constitutional validity of legislation unless it appears that an enactment brought in
question affects a party attacking it injuriously and actually; and even then the
scope of the decision should not be wider than that raised by the facts.2 9 Further-
24PROWSE v. ABINGDON, 1 Atk. 485 (Eng. 1738); ASHFORD v. THORNTON, 1 Barn. & Aid.
404, 460 (Eng. 1818).
25VANHORNE v. DoRRANCE, 2 Dall. 304, 309 (U. S. 1795).
26UTAH ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN v. BOWMAN, 38 Utah, 326 (1911); WEEKS v. BOYN.
TON, 37 Vt. 297, 301 (1864).
27Thayer, American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 137 (1893).-
STATE V. CARROLL, 38 Conn. 449, 472 (1871) accord.2 8ALLISON V. CORKER, 67 N. J. L. 596, 601 (1902).
29MASSACHUSETTS v. MELLON, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923); CORRIGAN V. BUCKLEY, 271 U. S.
323, 329 (1926); ESTATE OF JOHNSON, 139 Cal. 532 (1903); CURTIS PUBLISHING CO. V. CHICAGO,
273 II1. 373 (1916); STATE V. ROBERTS, 74 N. H. 476 (1908); BENNEDETTO v. KERN, 2 N. Y. S.
(2d) 844 (1938); SAYLES v. FOLEY, 38 R. I. 484, 491 (1916); VERHELST CONSTRUCTION Co. v.
GALLES, 204 Wis. 96, 101 (1931). See also authorities cited in note 15, tupra.
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more, even where such jurisdictional requirements prove to be fully satisfied it
is noticeable that an authoritative declaration of constitutionality or of unconstitu-
tionality, for all that it may be concededly correct in a given case, does not neces-
sarily preclude a different judgment in the future. How can a law be "null" when
we realize its constitutionality may depend upon environmental facts? The answer
seems obvious that such a conception of nullity would be erroneous; for it has been
authoritatively decided that a law valid when enacted may be rendered invalid
through later change of circumstances; and conversely it has been held that a
statute invalid at one time may become valid under a change of conditions taking
effect subsequent to a prior determination of unconstitutionality. s0 Today it is
well settled that if a statute is directed to a legitimate end, and its provisions are an
appropriate means to such an end, the legislative decision as to the necessity for
the adoption of such means is final"1 and obviously not within the sphere of judicial
reviewA2 American laws are graduated from the federal constitution downward;
and, as pointed out by the learned and clear-sighted Mr. Justice Lumpkin in the
case of Flint River Steamship Co. v. Foster,8s "it is the peculiar province of the
courts to ascertain and declare when any two of... several species of law conflict
with each other; and then it follows, as a matter of course, that the less must yield to
the greater."
A vast amount of litigation has arisen from time to time where there has
been insidious encroachment upon constitutional guarantees. In themselves such
indirect encroachments or infringements are seldom found to be a legal concern
of the judiciary. "It will not do to say that the exercise of an admitted power
of congress conferred by the constitution is to be withheld, if it appears or can be
shown that the effect and operation of the law may incidentally extend beyond the
limitations of the power. Upon any such interpretation the principal object of the
framers of the instrument in conferring the power would be sacrificed to the sub-
ordinate consequences resulting from its exercise. These consequences and inci-
dents are very proper considerations to be urged upon congress, for the purpose
of dissuading that body from its exercise, but afford no ground for denying the
power itself, or the right to exercise it."'8 4 It is submitted that the same rule should
be applied to state legislation.
Once in a while the law reports disclose unsuccessful efforts by parties litigant
to persuade courts of law to exercise an obsolete power to supply a casus omissus
or otherwise amend defective legislation. If judges should yield to such impor-
tunities, their compliance therewith would trench upon matters which are the sole
concern of the legislators; and consequently such encroachment upon the authority
SOMcKean, The Law of Necessity, 36 Dickinson L. Rev. 237, 239 (1932).
81NORMAN v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD Co., 294 U. S. 240, 311 (1935).
3 2
GERMAN ALLIANCE INSURANCE Co. v. LEwis, 233 U. S. 389, 414 (1914).
885 Ga. 194, 205 (1848).
8
4
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA V. WHEELING & BELMONT BRIDGE Co., 18 How. 421, 433 (U. S.
18535).
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of the law-makers would be ultra vires and violative of the constitutional mandate
to be guided by the principles of due process of law. Furthermore, it is fundamental
that the legislature has no power to shift the burden of the responsibility which it
owes to its constituents by authorizing anyone, even such a body of experts as a code
commission, to amend legislation.3 5 Notwithstanding all this, and in flagrant dis-
regard of the constitutional curbs upon legislation by courts, previously referred to,
we find an extraordinary assertion in a majority opinion of the United States Su-
preme Court, that the effect of a case therein cited was such that, "Its precept be-
came a part of the Constitution.'s We should remember, however, that even
Homer nods at times, and possibly the writer of that opinion meant no more than
that the doctrine of the case cited was so clearly implied in the Constitution as to
be embraced in its language. Not only is officious overactivity on the part of
courts discountenanced by an overwhelming majority of members of the judiciary;
but in addition it is elementary that any neglect or oversight of duty, such as is
technically known as abuse of discretion, is a subject for remedial action by upper
courts." On the other hand, it is the bounden duty of all courts to act when
properly appealed to.38 And while it has been picturesquely remarked that courts
have neither the power of the purse nor of the sword, judicial tribunals are not
altogether helpless to act in response to the call of duty; for one does not require
the encyclopedic erudition of Macauley's mythical schoolboy to realize that courts
of justice possess and exercise considerable power of control over marshals, sheriffs,
constables and other peace officers engaged in the enforcement and execution of
judicial process.
In a juridical sense, and to a marked degree so far as courts are concerned,
the legislative power of a state is supreme except in so far as it is limited and re-
stricted by fundamental law;39 and wherever it can be shown that a legislature has
authority to create new courts, it is permissible for it to relieve courts named in its
Constitution of some of their powers in apportioning jurisdiction.40 Somewhat
similarly, it has been recognized from a very early date in our national history that
Congress has unrestricted discretion to determine the number, the character and the
territorial limits of the courts among which it distributes judicial power, with
certain, determinate exceptions as respects the Supreme Court. This legislative
power to alter or amend the judicial system has made such a deep impression upon
35EBERT V. POSTON, 266 U. S. 548, 554 (1925); RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD v. ALTON
RAILWAY Co., 295 U. S. 330, 362 (1935); MAXWELL V. STATE, 40 Md. 273, 295 (1874); PEOPLE
v. DICKERSON, 164 Mich. 148 (1910); STATE v. GAUNT, 13 Ore. 115, 118 (1885).
3
6
UNITED STATES V. MORELAND, 258 U. S. 433, 438 (1921).
8
7
McKean, Some Aspects of Judicial Discretion, 40 Dickinson L. Rev. 168, 170 (1936).
3
8
COHENS V. VIRGINIA, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (U. S. 1821); WILLCOX v. CONSOLIDATED GAS
Co., 212 U. S. 19, 40 (1909).
39WHITE v. CITY, 225 Ala. 646 (1932); GILLESPIE v. BARRETT, 368 Il1. 607, 615 (1938);
LAUGHLIN V. CITY, 111 Me. 486 (1914); BANK OF CHENANGO v. BROWN, 26 N. Y. 467 (1863);
POOR DISmRICT CASE (No. 1), 329 Pa. 390, 399 (1938); STATE v. HENDERSON, 4 Wyo. 535, 545
(1893).4
OGERLACH V. MOORE, 243 Pa. 603, 609 (1914).
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certain commentators that they keep reminding us that in the year 1801, the Federal-
ists changed the number of Federal judges for partisan political purposes. Com-
pared with high-ranking tribunals of the individual states of the Union, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has an extremely limited original jurisdiction.
Even its appellate jurisdiction is subject to such exceptions and under such regula-
tions as may be required by Congress.' 1  This constitutional authority of the
national legislature, which empowers it to regulate the jurisdiction of the highest
forum of justice in the land, has been strikingly exemplified in the history of the
lDeading case entitled Ex parte McCardle,4 2 in which the appellate jurisdiction under
a habeas corpus act was repealed, after proceedings thereunder were argued in the
Supreme Court and taken under advisement. The court submitted to be divested
of its authority to proceed to judgment in the case before it, saying, inter alia,
"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
case." Since that momentous decision was handed down it has been firmly establish-
ed that "appellate review is not essential to due process of law but is a matter of
grace.'' 4s Another extensive field of legislative supremacy is likewise disclosed
in the recognized legislative power of conf'erring or withdrawing judicial authority
to take cognizance of suits against the government which is a corollary of the
familiar maxim that no one can sue the government without its consent. In all
likelihood the most singular instance of waiving governmental immunity from
suit, in legal history, is the consent of an American State to be sued by another
State "which is given by its admission into the Union."8 4
As previously noted, it has been remarked with great frequency that we
Americans have a tendency to look upon our Federal Supreme Court as a tribunal
endowed with plenary power to censor legislation conceived to be unconstitutional.
An illuminating comment upon this popular fallacy may be found in the leading
case of Massachusetts v. Mellon,45 where the court advanced the significant re-
minder that "since the formation of the government . . . a large number of
statutes appropriating or involving the expenditure of moneys for nonfederal
purposes have been enacted and carried into effect." The only present-day
check upon such improper and unconstitutional activities, is that of public opinion
"It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred by express constitutional or statutory provisions."46  Briefly stated, all
matters committed to the legislature or executive for final determination and dis-
41Constitution, Art. III; UNITED STATES V. UNION PACIFIc RAILROAD CO., 98 U. S. 569, 602-
603 (1878).
427 Wall. 506, 514 (U. S. 1868).
4
8LUCKENBACH STEAMSHIP Co. v. UNITED STATES, 272 U. S. 533, 536 (1926).
4 4
VIRGINIA V. WEST VIRGINIA, 206 U. S. 290, 319 (1907).4 5
Note 29, ante, p. 487.
4 6
PUTNAM v. NORBLAD, 134 Ore. 433, 440 (1930).
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posal in accordance with their sense of public duty are deemed political questions
and non-justiciable. When it comes to determining whether a question be political
and non-justiciable, the appropriateness, under our system of government, of
attributing finality to the action of the political departments, and also, the lack of
satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations.47
It follows from these considerations that American courts have no supervisory
control over the political branches of their governments, acting within the limits
of constitutional authority' s but are conclusively bound by the actions of the execu-
tive or legislature within the spheres of duty entrusted to them by fundamental
law.49 It is partly owing to this principle, that courts of law and equity lack the
competence to assume or control the legislative function of deciding what is required
by the public interest. Manifestly political discretion is not a matter with which
legal tribunals have a right to concern themselves. As previously noted in this
article, history and social experience have played a more important part in pricking
out the boundaries between justiciable and non-justiciable fields of influence than
that which has been the outcome of excogitation. In our own federal system, it is
not to be anticipated that a state which existed prior to the formation of the United
States, with a chief executive known as a president, should have identical political
and juridical organization with that of a state which has been subsequently ad-
mitted to the Union with naturally different traditions. Politics, (in the widest
sense of the word the science of civil government), like all other spheres of social
activity, is in a state of flux and development. For this and other reasons there is
an occasional diversity of theory to be found among our multiplicity of American
jurisdictions when dealing with public as well as with private rights and obligations.
In cases involving the action of the political branches of an American government
pertaining to what are known as political questions, it is virtually horn-book law
that the judiciary is conclusively bound to recognize the finality of such action.50
Th- political branches of the government, as is well recognized, are those which
primarily administer the affairs of the state or nation as differentiated from that
which judicially disposes of cases and controversies properly referred to it for
adjudication. For the most part the personnel of the executive and legislative
departments of governments are endowed with greater facilities and experience for
dealing with public affairs than those which are at the command of courts of justice;
and consequently have actual as well as legal competence to act in such matters.
As might be anticipated, the category of political questions is more a product of
practical experience than the result of scientific analysis. In American jurisdictions
it includes many constitutional powers whose enforcement is deliberately withheld
47COLEMAN V. MILLER, 307 U. S. 433, 454-5 (1939).
48WILSON v. SHAW, 204 U. S. 24, 32 (1907).
49 IN RE COOPER, 143 U. S. 472 (1892); BATES & GUILD CO. v. PAYNE, 194 U. S. 106, 108.
109 (1904); MILWAUKEE PUBLISHING CO. v. BURLESON, 255 U. S. 407, 413 (1921).
50PHILLIPS V. PAYNE, 92 U. S. 130 (1875).
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from the province of the judiciary.61 Among the questions which have been
adjudged to be political and not of judicial cognizance may be mentioned: the
ratification of a constitution or amendment thereof; the wisdom and expediency
or necessity of the means adopted by a legislative body to effect a legitimate object;
the recognition of a foreign sovereign or government; the guarantees to the States
of a republican form of government; the establishment of military government
at a certain date; and the exclusive and final jurisdiction of a legislative body
which tries an impeachment.62 It has thus been shown that courts of law and
equity are conclusively bound by official executive or legislative action upon political
questions. The doctrine of non-encroachment likewise prohibits judicial inter-
ference in legislation. An emphatic illustration of this principle is the familiar
rule that the judiciary is powerless to enjoin the enactment of laws alleged to be
unconstitutional. However the doctrine of non-encroachment does not forbid courts
to interpret or pass upon the constitutional validity of legislation under well-defined
conditions and restrictions previously referred to in this article. "The legislature
in determining what shall be done, what it is reasonable to do, does not divide its
duty with the judges, nor must it conform to their conception of what is prudent
or reasonable legislation. The judicial function is merely that of fixing the outside
border of reasonable legislative action, the boundary beyond which the taxing power,
the power of eminent domain, police power, and legislative power in general, cannot
go without violating the prohibition of the constitution or crossing the line of its
grants."53
It has been found necessary at a comparatively recent date to reiterate the
principle that" a court cannot assume to substitute its discretion for the discretion of
administrative or legislative bodies." 5' 4 Such transcending of the limits of judicial
authority would, in itself, be an abuse of discretion. It follows, as a matter of
course, that so far as executive and administrative officers are concerned, courts
are not empowered to require any government officer to forsake his duty to exercise
his own judgment in accordance with a discretion reposed in him by law. After
the officer has exercised such judgment, courts would have no power of review
except in cases of abuse of discretion such as a mistake of law, finding of fact
with no substantial basis of evidence, or fraud or imposition, none of which factors
could be reconciled with a concept of lawful discretion. 56 There is authority for
SlSee: Dodd, Judicially Non-enforcible Provisions of the Constitution, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev.
54 (1931).
5 2
MAREURy v. MADISON, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (U. S. 1803); LUTHER v. BORDEN, 7 How. 1
(U. S. 1849); KEELY V. SANDERS, 9 Otto, 441, 446 (U. S. 1878); WILLIAMS v. SUFFOLK INSUR-
ANcE Co., 13 Peters 415, 420 (U. S. 1839) ; JUILLARD v. GREENMAN, 110 U. S. 421, 450 (1884) ;
OETJEN V. CENTRAL LEATHER Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918); RITTER V. UNITED STATES, 84 Ct. CI.
293 (1936); MCCONAUGHY V. SECRETARY OF STATE, 106 Minn. 392, 414 (1909); PUTNAM V.
NORELAD, 134 Ore. 433 (1930); ARMSTRONG v. KING, 281 Pa. 207 (1924); COMMONWEALTH
v. STOFCHEK, 322 Pa. 513 (1936); CHASE v. BILLINGS, 106 Vt. 149 (1934); MIGHELL V. SULTAN
OF JOHORE, [1894] 1 Q. B. 149 (Eng.)
58Thayer, LEGAL ESSAYS, 27 (1923 ed.).6 4
WALLACE V. FEEHAN, 205 Ind. 522, 534 (1934).
55GAINES v. THOMPSON, 7 Wall. 347 (U. S. 1868); VIRGINIAN Ry. v. UNITED STATES, 272
U. S. 658, 663 (1926); BORGNIS v. FALK, 147 Wis. 327 (1910).
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the position that even the exercise of judgment in expounding laws under which a
government official's duty requires him to act, cannot be controlled by a court."
But this well-founded principle should be carefully measured by its ratio legis, which
is conceived to be abstention from encroachment tending to obstruct or impede
the orderly conduct of government business. Consequently it would be ultra vires
for a ministerial official to take the position that a statute under which he is re-
quired to act, is unconstitutional. However, as was once said by the painter, Ingres,
"to follow a principle blindly is to abuse it"; and it would seem that there is an
exception to this last-stated rule, when such officer raises a question of uncon-
stitutionality because of a personal stake in the matter brought before him.57
In virtually all cases having to do with governmental activities, courts are
closely restricted to questions of power and not concerned with matters of policy.
Moreover "judicial power as contradistinguished from the power of the law has
no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing."
5 8
Hence courts have no competence to initiate suits or prosecutions; and, as previously
noted, have no authority to raise or decide questions of constitutionality of their own
motion. Considerations of expediency, utility and comity may serve as useful
guides in determining whether it is lawful to attempt to exercise a power whose
character is not the same as that of the authority possessed. Furthermore, if it ap-
pear to be impossible to carry through undertakings foreign in their nature to
those primarily imposed upon particular officers of the government, it would seem
obvious that such undertakings are outside of their respective legal spheres of
action. This latter reason accounts in part for the rule that executive officers have
no right to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes, which is exclusively a matter
for courts. The right to raise a question of unconstitutionality where there is a
personal stake in the matter is not an infringement of a duty to refrain from deciding
the same.59 Impracticability and inexpediency constitute contributory reasons for
the corresponding rule of non-encroachment which forbids judicial tribunals to
weigh legislative questions of policy, or usurp the powers of public prosecutors,
or other executive officers. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the
fundamental principle of necessity comes into play wherever the transaction of
public business reasonably demands the exercise of functions which, at first blush,
may seem to pertain to other branches of government. Almost needless to say,
this docfrine is available to all departments of government. Primarily it is the
duty of all government officers to read and apply statutes which they are required to
enforce.6 0 This proposition is clear if we recognize that as a corollary to the maxim
that public officers are presumed to do their duty, there is in logical sequence a
56DECA1IUR v. PAULDING, 14 Peters, 497 (U. S. 1840); STATE V. VERNER, 30 S. Car. 277
(1888).
57 VAN HORN v. STATE, 46 Neb. 62 (1895).
5 8
OSBORN v. THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, 9 Wheat. 733, 866 (U. S. 1824).
59Compare VAN HORN V. STATE, note 57, SUPRA.
60Expert advice and assistance in coping with difficult problems in the transaction of public
business, is almost invariably accessible to government officers.
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presumption that public officials know the laws prescribing the performance of
such duty. At any rate the primary right and duty of public officials to interpret
the law which they are sworn to observe, is impliedly recognized by the courts which
frequei~tly employ executive or administrative construction of statutes as a canon of
interpretation within well-established limits of the ancient and at the same time
modem rule, Communis error facit jus.1* As a general rule neither the legislative
department nor the executive department of an American government can be
curbed in its action by the judicial branch, although such action when completed,
may be reviewed by courts of law, in such cases as may be properly justiciable.
In action is another matter, for superior courts are empowered to enforce the
performance of ministerial duties by executive officers and inferior judges and
courts, by means of the writ of mandamus. Ministerial duties, it may be observed
in passing, are those which do not demand the exercise of discretion, such as the
performance by court clerks of prescribed duties;62 or the levying of execution by
sheriffs or constables; 6s suit by a party entitled to the performance of a ministerial
duty against an official charged with its execution is not accounted a suit against
such official's government."
At the same time it should not be overlooked that the fundamental principle
of non-encroachment restrains courts from taking jurisdiction where administrative
remedies are available and there has been failure to use the same.65 Likewise an
evasion of executive jurisdiction may disentitle a complainant to a judicial hearing.
60
In exceptional cases where an executive officer exceeds an authority conferred upon
him by law, in promulgation of an ultra vires order under color of his office, the
judicial authority will enjoin him from carrying such illegal order into effect.
67
It is not always easy for an administrative officer to steer his course between the
Scylla of anarchical inefficiency and the Charybdis of unconstitutional autocracy,
with satisfactory results. In such a case, as that just outlined, there is no judicial
interference with the administrative action in drafting the order-which would be
highly improper and would go beyond the verge of judicial authority-for it cannot
be stressed too often that no branch of the government is to be hampered in the
exercise of its primary functions. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked
that the jurisprudence of English-speaking people lays especial emphasis upon the
importance of safe-guarding the individual against governmental or community
oppression, as well as against attempted wrong-doing by individuals. When
necessity demands it, this protection will be accorded by means of that branch of
the law of remedies which is known to our system of laws as equity. This tra-
ditional solicitude for human rights is so deeply rooted in American jurisdictions
6lMcKean, Communis error jacit jus, 34 Dickinson L. Rev. 34, 43.
6 2RuSSEL v. DAvis, 99 N. C. 115 (1888).
68FREUDENSTEIN v. McNEIR, 81 nl1. 208 (1876).6 4HousTON v. ORMES, 252 U. S. 469 (1920).
65CHICAGO, MNILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PAC. RY. Co. v. RISLY, 276 U. S. 560 (1928).
6 6CHIN BAK SHAN V. UNITED STATES, 186 U. S. 193, 201 (1902).
67WoRK v. LOUISIANA, 269 U. S. 250, 254 (1925).
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that we even find equity powers exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of
an unconstitutional statute "whenever it is essential, in order to protect property
rights and the rights of the person against injuries otherwise irremediable. '"68
Historically this valued heritage of our race dates back to the days when feudal law
worked out the principle that the government is below the law, a doctrine recognized
by Bracton, Magna Carta, and American constitutions, which has been aptly sum-
marized in the pithy maxim, "No man is above the law." The seemingly anti-
thetical saying that the king can do no wrong, is taken to mean that a government
cannot authorize wrong.69 Assuredly "nothing better becomes authority than that
it should live by the laws." 70 At this point, it is interesting to observe that both
the fifth and the fourteenth articles of amendment of the constitution of the Unitd
States guarantee the protection of due process of law against any violation of
human rights by any form of governmental activity, whether through legislative,
executive or judicial agency. 71 So far as this particular guarantee relates to the
exercise of judicial power, it may be stated that no judgment of a court of law
or equity satisfies the requirements of due process of law, if a single jurisdictional
fact be lacking.
President Cleveland's well-known maxim that public office is a public trust,
formulates a thought which among other considerations is conducive to the very
proper reluctance of courts of justice to subject a chief executive to judicial process;
and thereby bring about a state of affairs which might halt, or at least hamper, the
transaction of public business. Imagine the devastating mischief and chaos which
might easily ensue were the President or a governor, while in office, to be at the
beck and call of anyone who might feel a desire to drag a chief executive before
a court of justice. An immunity from judicial process, during tenure of office,
(which is unquestioned in the case of the President, and should not be disputed in
the case of the governor of a state), is not a violation of the maxim that no man
is above the law, for a chief magistrate is answerable to a political tribunal, a court
of impeachment, which is the constitutional forum in which a chief executive may
be tried for offences sufficiently serious to require that he be put on the defensive
for maleficent acts. Furthermore, this politic and sensible exemption of a chief
executive from judicial process does not leave a private citizen uttrly helpless, for
the latter may resort to the protection of the courts of law and of equity where
ultra vires executive activities specifically violate his property or personal rights. 72
68CHAMPION REFG. Co. v. COMMISSION, 286 U. S. 210, 238 (1932).
6
9
LONGFORD v. UNITED STATES, 101 U. S. 341 (1879); FEATHER v. THE QUEEN, 6 B. & S.
257, 295 (Eng. 1865).
70Bracton, DE LEGIBUS, xvi Sec. 3.
"71Cf. ScoTr v. McNEAL, et al., 154 U. S. 34 (1894). One marked difference between the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, is that the former contains no guarantee of equal protection of
the law.
72STATE OF MISSISSIPPI V. JOHNSON, 4 Wall. 475, 500 (U. S. 1860); PUBLIC CLEARING
HOUSE v. COYNE, 194 U. S. 497, 516 (1904); Ex PARTr ORozco, 201 Fed. 106 (1912); McCAR-
THy v. COMMONWEALTH, 204 Mass. 482 (1910).
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Such court decisions upon the validity of executive acts do not amount to unwarrant-
able intrusion upon the domain of a political branch of the government, but, in our
American system, would constitute the exercise by judicial tribunals of their right
and bounden duty to judge the law and apply it when properly and legitimately
appealed to. A vast majority of State jurisdictions recognize the constitutional
fitness and propriety of the immunity of a chief magistrate from judicial process,78
a principle which, as is well known, was emphasized by President Jtfferson, who
settled the question when he successfully disputed the validity of a subpoena issued
to him by Chief Justice Marshall.
It is regrettable that federal courts have permitted themselves to be employed
as agencies to molest chief magistrates of American States, instead of recognizing and
acknowledging the seemliness and propriety of according to governors an official
freedom from judicial process. The recent recognition by the United States Supreme
Court of "sovereignty of the States," is noticeably incompatible with toleration of
federal court interference with State governments. 74 An American chief executive
is entrusted with the duty of taking care "that the laws be faithfully executed,"
and undoubtedly the discharge of this obligation is his most important official
function. So important is this responsibility for law enforcement that the head of
the executive branch of an American government, State as well as Federal, is vested
with the office and powers of commander-in-chief in order that the military as well
as the civil arm may be employed by him in time of stress or emergency. There
is authority for contending that a chief executive has power to interfere in criminal
cases so far as to cause the abandonment of prosecutions in order to terminate such
proceedings and procure the discharge of the accused; 75 but interference by a chief
executive with judges is not allowable. 6 The official freedom of a chief executive
from judicial process, previously referred to, is no protection to his subordinates
seeing that the rule that officers or other agents of the government are answerable
for the consequences of their trespasses or other illegal acts although committed in
obedience to the commands of a superior77 is so all-inclusive that it covers the case
where subordinates have obeyed an illegal order of the President. 8
From time to time it has been sought to extenuate the seeming harshness of
this wholesome rule, which exists for the protection of the private citizen, by
observing that public office is accepted cum onere; but inasmuch as American legisla-
73RICE v. THE GOVERNOR, 207 Mass. 577 (1911); SUTHERLAND v. THE GOVERNOR, 29 Mich.
320 (1874); DONNELLY v. ROOSEVELT, GOVERNOR, 259 N. Y. S. 355 (1932); HARTRANFT'S
APPEAL, 85 Pa. 433 (1877).
74UNITED STATES V. PINK, 62 Supreme Court Reporter, 552, 567 (1942); PENN-DAvIES v.
MILK CONTROL COMMISSION, 63 id. 617, 621 (1943), ACCORD.
"EUNITED STATES V. CORRIE, 25 Fed. Cas. 658 (1860).7
6IN RE KAINE, 14 How. 103, 140, 141 (U. S. 1852).
7 7
WIsE V. WITHERS, 7 Cranch 331 (U. S. 1806); MITCHELL v. HARMONY, 13 How. 15
(U. S. 1851); LOWRY v. ERWIN, 6 Robinson, 192, 205 (La. 1843).7 SLTTLE v. BARREME, 2 Cranch, 170 (U. S. 1804). Furthermore, anyone who is illegally
arrested by the executive order of the President, is entitled to discharge on habeas corpus, Ex PARTE
ORozCo, note (72), SUPRA.
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tures have unquestioned authority to recognize and discharge the moral obligations of
their respective governments, 79 they may be looked to for appropriate action in
alleviation of unmerited hardship which might follow where public officers are
mulcted for obeying the commands of their superiors. But regardless of what
action might be taken by the legislative authorities, it is not to be overlooked that
a "government does not become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its
agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its work.' '8
The constitutional doctrine that the federal government is restricted to powers
specifically enumerated in the constitution, or implied from enumerated powers,
applies only to internal affairs.81 This canon of interpretation is so rigid that the
United States government is not permitted to profit by unconstitutional activity of
its officers or agents.8 2 External affairs are on a different footing from that of
internal affairs, for they are entrusted to the President "in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the (federal) constitution. '" 8 An important resultant of
this principle is the military duty of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces to set up provisional governments (including courts), in occupied
enemy territory, in order to ensure the security of persons and property, and provide
an adequate and satisfactory administration of justice. This power, vested in the
President, extends so far as the laws of war permit, except where restrained by the
pledges of the government or in cases limited by Congressional action.84 At this
point it might seem supererogatory to remark that officers and agents of the govern-
ment, should carefully avoid making promises beyond the scope of their delegated
authority; were it not a matter of history that, at one time, an eminent army officer
made a pledge of citizenship to the inhabitants of an invaded West Indian Island,
which assurance was repudiated by the United States government. Briefly sum-
marized, a president's political decisions are non-justiciable, and his liability for
his behavior, while occupying his high office, is to a court of impeachment alone,
although his non-political acts may be passed upon by judicial authority. But it
must not be overlooked that a president's agents and other officers are subject to
judicial process for infractions of law, 85 and furthermore, it is a matter of every
day observation that Congress has power to prescribe the routine duties of a presi-
dent's subordinates. At the same time it should not be overlooked. that there is no
legislative or judicial check upon a chief executive's important power to approve or
disapprove an enactment, for that function is personal, a high prerogative, and
non-delegable.
86
79UNITED STATES v. REALTY CO., 163 U. S. 427, 438, 444 (1896); MURDOCK v. COMMON-
WEALTH, 152 Mass. 17 (1890).
80KEIFFER & KEIFFER v. RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORP., 306 U. S. 381, 388 (1939).
SlUNITED STATES v. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORP., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
82SILVERTHORN LUMEER CO. v. UNITED STATES, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
8
8UNITED STATES V. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORP., note (81), suPRA.
84CRoss v. HARRISON, 6 How. 164 (U. S: 1853); THE GRAPESHOT, 9 Wall. 129 (U. S. 1869);
PLANTERS BANK V. UNION BANK, 16 Wall. 483 (1872); HERRERA V. UNITED STATES, 222 U. S.
558 (1911).
5ICKES v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937). See also cases cited in notes 72, 77, 78 & 80, suPRA.8 6TuTrLE V. BOSTON, 215 Mass. 57 (1913).
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It is almost axiomatic that there would be no vitality in law, were conscientious
and efficient administration found to be lacking; for, at all tines, much of the pro-
cedure by which governments are carried on has been administrative or executive.
Administrative law is not of such recent origin as many commentators seem to
think. Just as there was a law of quasi-contracts before Professor Keener classified
it and gave it a name, so there has been administrative law, centuries before its
systematic study in the last decades of the 19th century. So far back as the reign
of Henry III, of England, there was a commission of sewers, in Romney Marsh
87
The most famous administrative officials in the history of English law and institu-
tions, are the justices of tht peace, originally "conservators of the peace," "statutory
officials having no traditional or common law powers," as phrased in Jenks' SHORT
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW. 88 Amongst numerous duties, these functionaries
settled questions of order, roads and bridges, prices and wages, and fixed the rates
to be charged by common carriers. Most of these undertakings have now been
transferred to administrative tribunals. While the law of justices of the peace
is exclusively statutory in England, there is authority for considering such statutes,
as may be deemed applicable, to be "common law" in American jurisdictions.89
Practically all administrative power is derived from statutory enactment; and it is
a matter of elementary observation that a statute has three parts, viz., declaratory,
directory and vindicatory. Standards and other limitations of administrative
activity are directory, and their fixation is legislative, and non-delegable.9 0 Here
it may be noted that there are two main divisions of legislative power; that which
is delegable and that which is not delegable. Such primary functions as exclusively
pertain to supreme legislative power, mainly lawmaking, policy-making and taxation
are non-delegable. 91 Exercise of the policy-making function occasionally leads to
legislation descending into minute details, especially where the legislators are dis-
satisfied with the attitude of administrative officers; but ordinarily, matters of detail
are left to the discretion of other agencies such as courts, executive officers, adminis-
trative boards, commissions, etc., where some statutory standards, rules, or other
limitations fix ascertainable bounds to the authority conferred. 92 Matters which
historically and traditionally have been of such an ambiguous character as to be
exercised by the legislature at pleasure, or be entrusted to other branches of the
873 B1. CoM. 529 n. I.
882d ed. 1922, p. 153.
89 STATE v. MCNEIL, 33 La. Ann. 1332 (1881); McKean, British Statutes in American Juris-
dictions, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195, 215 (1929).
90Compare: O'NEIL V. INSURANCE CO., 166 U. S. (1895); PANAMA REPINING CO. v. RYA,
293 U. S. 388 (1935); SCHECTER POULTRY CORPORATION V. UNITED STATES, 295 U. S. 495
(1935) ; HOLGATE BROTHERS COMPANY v. BASHORE, 331 Pa. 255 (1938).
91WAYNE v. SOUTHARD, 10 Wheat. 1, 42 (U. S. 1825); FIELD V. CLARK, 143 U. S. 649
(1892); MONONGAHELA BRIDGE CO. v. UNITED STATES, 216 U. S. 177, 192 (1910); STATE v.
TRAVELLER'S INSURANCE Co., 73 Conn. 255, 262 (1900); LOCKE'S APPEAL, 72 Pa. 491 (18 );
IN RE APPOINTMENT OF REVISOR, 141 Wis. 592 (1910).9 2
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. ILLINOIS RAILWAY Co., 215 U. S. 452 (1910);
MUTUAL FILM CORPORATION V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 236 U. S. 230 (1915); HAMPTON &
CO. v. UNITED STATES, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928); MORGAN v. UNITED STATES, 04 U. S. 1
(1938); ROHRER V. MILK CONTROL BOARD, 322 Pa. 257, 277 (19 6).
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government uncurbed by hampering restrictions, are clearly delegable. To repeat
an oft-quoted maxim, familiar to readers of Holmes on the COMMON LAW, thle
life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience." There are many gov-
ernmental usages and practices so firmly established as to constitute due process
of law, and be implied as such in American constitutions. This principle naturally
follows from a canon of interpretation that resort may be had to the common law,
and British statute and institutions, as an aid to elucidation of the language of an
American constitution.9 Ignorance of the teachings of the past sometimes occasions
disastrous blunders. Returning to the topic of delegated powers, a legislature
may if it so desires, enact by-laws for municipal corporations; or at its option, it
may empower such subordinate governing bodies to draft and enforce their own
local ordinances, under proper limitations and restrictions. It also has the option
of enacting statutes covering the subject of legal procedure, or of leaving much of
its detail to be governed by rules of court. Power "to fill up details" is not an
ultra vires delegation of legislative power.94 Hence it is not considered an invalid
exertion of legislative power, for a court to decide in a litigated case, whether par-
ticular acts come within a generic statutory provision.95 In relation to generic sta-
tutory provisions, an exceedingly interesting and perhaps extreme instance of
legislative delegation of power authorizing courts of law to "fill in details" is
afforded by the famous Statute of Westminister I,96 under which much of the law
of torts and quasi-contracts was developed.
On the general subject of power, Sir William Holdsworth's succinct phrasing
may be quoted, at this point. It is as follows, "The existence or non-existence of a
power or duty is a matter of law and not of fact, and so must be determined by
reference to some enactment or reported case.97 From the days when William
the Conqueror's Norman officials employed inquests as fact-finding agencies, fact-
finding has not been deemed an exclusively judicial function. Hence courts have
power to delegate to masters, auditors and similar agents to conduct hearings on
disputed or intricate matters, and report their conclusions thereon to tht judge or
bench appointing them.
This inherent power does not extend so far as to permit a judge to deltgate
a judicial duty or subdelegate a judicial function. 98 At the same time the perform-
ance of sundry acts considered by courts of law to be exercises of administrative
98SMITH v. ALABAMA, 124 U. S. 465 (1888); Ex PARTE GROSSMAN, 267 U. S. 87 (1925);
PHILLIPS V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 283 U. S. 589 (1931); ATTORNEY-GENERAL
v. JocHIN, 99 Mich. 358 (1894); Chief Justice Taft, Foreword to Jones, AMERICAN MEMBERS OF
THE INNS OF COURT (1924).
9 4
UNITED STATES V. GRIMAUD, 220 U. S. 505 (1910); RED "C" OIL MANUFACTURING CO. V.
BOARD OF AGRICULTURE, 222 U. S. 380 (1912); HUMPHREY'S EXECUTOR V. UNITED STATES, 295
U. S. 602.
95STANDARD OIL CO. v. UNITED STATES, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
9613 Edw. I c. 24 (1285).
976 Halsbury, LAWS OF ENGLAND, 379 (2d ed. 1932).
98 BRIGGS v. REYNOLDS, 176 Ill. App. 420 (1912); STATE v. NOBLE, 119 Ind. 350 (1888);
McCoY v. ABLE, 131 Ind. 417 (1891); VAN SLYKE V. FIRE INSURANCE CO., 39 Wis. 390 (1876).
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functions may be delegated to courts, although not accounted judicial when per-
formed by them. A very familiar group of such deputed activities includes, the ap-
pointment of members of park commissions and school boards; the licensing of
private detectives and inn-keepers; officiating at civil marriages; and approval of
corporation charters. It is surmised that the discharge of many of these duties,
by American courts, has historic antecedents in the practice of the old English
Courts of Quarter Sessions of the Peace; in addition to the demands of the social
convenience and administrative necessities of sparsely settled communities of Ameri-
can pioneers. All tribunals, administrative and judicial alike, lack the power to
require testimony, except in cases where the investigation concerns a specific breach
of the law. 99 Even then, there is no such thing as contempt of a subordinate admin-
istrative body. However an order of court based upon an issue of law, such as a
refusal to present evidence in such a body may be used by a court of law as a basis
for contempt proceedings in the event that its mandate be uncomplied with.100
Where duties of an ambiguous character are imposed upon a judicial officer,
by legislative enactment, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of the
statute, and the power held to be judicial. 101 There is a similar presumption in the
case of duties imposed upon executive or administrative officers. All of this follows
from the fundamental principle that every intendment is in favor of the constitu-
tionality of a statute. It is a matter of practical and urgent necessity that something
be left to the judgment and discretion of administrative officers to accomplish, in
detail, that which is authorized or required by law phrased in general terms. 10 2
But it should never be overlooked that such activities are limited by the funda-
mental principle of Anglo-Saxon governments, that the rights of men are to be
determined by the law itself, and "not by the let or leave of bureaus." At all
events, any unnecessary impairment to the point of practical destruction of a right
safeguarded by an American constitution is invalid, whether effected by legislative
enactment or by executive or judicial administration, as being violative of funda-
mental law. Consequently the right to carry on a lawful business or occupation
cannot be made to depend upon the arbitrary will, whim or caprice of any man or
board, in an English-speaking community. Some -standard established by law is
indispensable, and the fact of compliance or non-compliance therewith may then
be determined by legally constituted authority. So far as courts of law are concerned,
an unabused exercise of administrative or executive discretion in the discharge of
lawfully delegated powers, is deemed non-justiciable. 0° In addition to this limita-
tion upon judicial power, it should be noted that it would be an act of usurpation
99HARRIMAN V. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
100INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. BRiMSON, 154 U. S. 457, 489 (1894).
101STATE V. BATES, 96 Minn. 110, 116 (1905).
102BATRS & GUILD CO. V. PAYNE, 194 U. S. 106 (1904); PETmON OF STATE EX. REL. AT,
TORNEY GE1NERAL AND OTHERS, 220 Wis. 25 (1936); See also cases cited in note 94 SUPRA.
losCf. cases cited in note 55 supra.
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for a court to review an administrative act from an administrative standpoint. 104
This principle is so deeply rooted in our system of jurisprudence, that even legisla-
tion authorizing. a judicial tribunal to modify an administrative order, lacks con-
stitutional validity.105 In non-technical language, courts decide whether administra-
tive or executive officers have overstepped the limits of delegated authority, but
do not rewrite administrative orders, although they may affirm or reverse the same;
and in the latter case courts of law have the constitutional power of exonerating
a party from an order that exceeds the law. 106
In determining whether an order of an administrative body or official would
be suspended or set aside, there are three major points worthy of consideration:107
1. All relevant questions of constitutional power or right. Thus: a denial of
an opportunity for a hearing; 10 abuse of discretion, such as arbitrarily and unreason-
ably refusing to receive important additional testimony adduced without undue de-
lay,109 or findings of fact which are without evidence, contrary to the indisputable
character of the evidence, inadequate or arbitrary in any respect'" would be subject
to judicial review as violations of fundamental law.
2. All pertinent questions whether or not the administrative order was within
the scope of delegated authority, under which it purported to be made."1
3. Whether, though formally the order be correct, it had been arrived at in
such an unreasonable manner as not to be within the scope of delegated authority. 112
To recapitulate: Where an intra vires order of an administrative official has
reasonable grounds for its promulgation, it is conclusive;1 13 for administrative
process of tht customary sort is as much due process as any other kind.114 This is
104STANDARD OIL CO. v. UNITED STATES, 283 U. S. 235 (1931); FEDERAL RADIO COMMIS-




05KELLER V. POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923).
106BACON v. RUTLAND RAILROAD Co., 232 U. S. 134 (1913).
10
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD Co., 215 U. S. 452,
470 (1910).
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ELoUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILWAY CO. V. UNITED STATES, 245 U. S. 463 (1918); VIR-
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not surprising if we stop to consider, that English equity originated as an adminis-
trative system, and that the prerogative writs of common law began as administra-
tive orders. At the present time, findings of fact of administrative tribunals bear
a close analogy to those of a chancellor, which, as is well known, have the force
and effect of a verdict. Furthermore, matters of expert technical knowledge, which
it is not practical to present in court by testimony, with any degree of clarity are
generally considered the sole responsibility of an administrative tribunal, entrusted
to its discretion, and not subject to judicial review. 115 However, the interpretation
of statutes by administrative officers is a matter of law, usually considered juris-
dictional, and in consequence is subject to judicial review. 116 At the risk of undue
repetition, it may be here stated that all non-political questions of governmental
power, are justiciable. And it is not to be presumed that any court would exceed
its own jurisdiction, unless it appears plainly that it has done so.' "It must act
judicially in all things, and cannot then transcend the power conferred by law."'
1 8
Specifically, "All courts, even the highest, are more or less limited in their jurisdic-
tion: they are limited to particular classes of action . . . . or to particular modes
of administering relief .... or to transactions of a special character ... or to the
use of particular process in the enforcement of their judgments." 119 Consequently,
"It is important ... that in a free country ... those entrusted with its administra-
tion ... confine themselves within their respective spheres, avoiding in the exercise
of the powers of one government to encroach upon another."' 2 0 Nevertheless, "If
in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the constitutional
powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way
which the constitution designates."'1
2'
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115UNITED STATES v. LANE, 250 U. S. 549 (1919); WILLIAMS V. UNITED STATES, 281 U. S.
206 (1930).
l6UNITED STATES V. UNITED VERDE COPPER CO., 196 U. S. 207 (1905).
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"lllbidem.
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